Presidential address: “These united colonies are…”  by Bredenberg, Carl E.
Thank you for the opportunity to serve as your
president for this past year. This recognition is more
broadly addressed to the surgeons of my adopted
state, Maine. Among them, Ferris Ray, who served
as vice president of this society, stands out as the one
surgeon who did the most to forge vascular surgery
as a distinct specialty in Maine. The real heart of a
surgical society is the secretary, and I want particu-
larly to thank Jim Menzoian for his indefatigable
efforts. Jim continues the distinguished line of
strong secretaries with which this society has been
blessed. 
“These United Colonies are . . .”—the phrase, of
course, comes from the Declaration of Independence:
“We, therefore, the Representatives of the United
States of America, in General Congress, Assembled . . .
solemnly publish and declare, That these United
Colonies are and of Right ought to be Free and
Independent States.”1
What jars the modern ear is the plurality of the 
syntax: “These United Colonies are . . . Free and
Independent States.” The verb is plural, which implies
a plural subject. Today we would say, “The United
States is a free and independent nation.” The third-per-
son singular in the verb explicitly states our perception
of a single nation, a concept that is not at all clear in our
Declaration of Independence. The emphasis on the
plurality of the colonies is not accidental; it fills the
operative paragraph: “They are absolved from all alle-
giance to the British Crown . . . All political connection
between them and the state of Great Britain is and
ought to be totally dissolved . . . As Free and
Independent States, they have full Power.”1
The problem of unity and the tension between
peripheral autonomy and central authority have
been central to the history of the United States. Are
we a single nation or a federation of sovereign states?
This tension was most dramatically confronted dur-
ing the roughly 100 years from 1763 to 1865. I
should like to briefly review this interval in our
nation’s history, because I believe many of the issues
that played out so dramatically are common to all
human organizations, because organization itself is
crucial to human endeavor, and because, as many
people see it, the future quality of health care in this
country depends, in part, on improving our organi-
zation of health care delivery. As you listen to this
interpretation of history, you may hear issues famil-
iar to your own experience.
In 1763, the Peace of Paris concluded the Seven
Years’ War, one of a series of European wars stretch-
ing back to the late 17th century, which arose large-
ly over the conflict between France’s attempts to
establish hegemony in Europe and England’s
attempt to thwart these efforts with a balance of
European powers. These wars had spilled onto the
North American continent as the so-called French
and Indian Wars.2 In North America at Quebec,
Wolfe’s victory in 1759 on the Plains of Abraham
(named not after the Old Testament patriarch, but
after Abraham Martin, a French river pilot and
farmer) gave Britain all of French Canada and all the
land east of the Mississippi down to the lower
Mississippi delta. It was a great victory, which cost
the 32-year-old major general’s life when he stood in
front of one of his regiments ready to personally lead
the bayonet charge that followed the devastating
close-range British musket volleys that had already
determined the outcome of the battle.3
Wars cost money as well as lives, and Britain’s
victory in the Seven Years’ War increased the British
national debt nearly 21/2-fold.4 The king and parlia-
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ment felt that the American colonies should be taxed
to contribute to the cost of their own defense. The
American colonists, like everyone else before or
since, objected to taxes. The centers for the conflict
of the colonies with England were Virginia and New
England. New England had been populated largely
by Puritan refuges from East Anglia, a section of
England east of London with particularly strong tra-
ditions of both literacy and support of representa-
tion over arbitrary power.5 It was the regional power
base for Cromwell and the Puritan parliament,
which rose in revolt against the Stuart attempt at
absolute monarchy during the previous century.
Moreover, in New England, Virginia, and most
other colonies, the representative assemblies, like
their prototype, the English parliament, maintained
control of the purse. Tax revenue raised by the
assemblies provided the salaries for the royal gover-
nors and judges. Their financial dependence on the
representative assemblies was a major factor in keep-
ing these officials responsive to the colony’s 
interest.4
It is important to understand, however, that
these were already 13 very independent colonies;
that is, they were independent from one another.
New England was initially populated by parliamen-
tary Puritans from East Anglia. New York began as a
Dutch province. Quakers founded Pennsylvania.
Prisoners were the initial colonists of Georgia.
Aristocratic and religiously conservative planters
ruled the tidelands of Virginia, Maryland, and the
Carolinas. Travel among the colonies was difficult,
over poor dirt roads and by small coastal vessels.
Their governors reported back to proprietors in
England. There was the most rudimentary of admin-
istration of the colonies as a whole, and that existed
only in England as the Board of Trade and a large
uncoordinated group of ministries and departments
in the English government.4 There had been an
early attempt of coordinated activity among the 13
colonies. The English called for a congress in Albany
in 1754 to coordinate a common defense to the mil-
itary threats of the French and the Indians.
Representatives of only eight colonies attended. The
plan of union that emerged, authored in part by
Benjamin Franklin, proposed a union of the colonies
with a relatively strong central government. It failed
to be ratified by a single colony.2 Clearly local auton-
omy held sway. 
Despite these differences, there were important
common features. The voting citizens considered
themselves Englishmen, with the rights of Englishmen
(women and slaves, among others, could not vote).
They shared the still developing and imperfect English
tradition of representative government, and, to a
greater extent than their English cousins, they prac-
ticed these rights of self-government.2,4,5
In this setting, a series of parliamentary acts were
pushed through by the king’s ministers and the
king’s purse, attempting to raise money from the
colonies and establishing a more effective adminis-
trative system to extract that money. The challenge
of these acts called forth responses from the
colonies—responses that progressively shifted the
argument from one of simply economic cost to that
of political infringement, the reduction in tradition-
al English liberties. Most important, through these
responses the colonies gradually learned the value of
cooperative activity.
In 1765, the Stamp Act passed by parliament was
the first direct internal tax laid on the colonies.2,4 It
was paid by buying a stamp affixed to a wide variety
of necessary documents and publications. The
Virginia Assembly voted on a series of resolutions
objecting to the Stamp Act, focusing on the princi-
ple of no taxation without representation. The cir-
culation of these Virginia Resolutions among the
colonies began to unite public opinion in opposi-
tion. American politics has always had a rough-and-
tumble character to it. In Boston, this united oppo-
sition presented as a temporary union between the
North End and South End mobs, which had tradi-
tionally engaged in fighting one another. In
response to the Stamp Act, they united in riot
against the crown officials, forcing the stamp com-
missioner to resign, and then mobbed and wrecked
the house of the lieutenant governor, Thomas
Hutchinson. The lieutenant governor and his fami-
ly, seated at dinner, fled just in time to save their
lives. In Connecticut, stamp agent Jared Ingersoll
was burned in effigy in Norwich, New London,
Lyme, West Haven, and New Haven. Ingersoll also
fled to save his life. This united and often violent
opposition forced the repeal of the Stamp Act in
1766.4 Parliament, refusing to learn, the very next
year passed the Townsend Acts, which added addi-
tional import duties in the colonies. Worse, it reor-
ganized the customs service to make it more effec-
tive and established a board of commissioners of the
customs in Boston. This efficiency interfered with
one of the traditional and lucrative commercial
enterprises of New England: smuggling.2,4 Things
were getting serious. Significantly, the money gener-
ated from these taxes was to be used to pay the
salaries of royal governors and judges, allowing them
to act independently of local colonial assemblies. 
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In objecting, the colonies attempted to cooperate
among themselves in economic warfare against
England, creating nonimportation agreements that
were applied with varying success. Again, riots
ensued in New York City, and, in March 1770, the
infamous Boston Massacre occurred. Parliament
repealed the Townsend Acts, except for the three
cents per pound tax on tea. In one of parliament’s
most misguided actions, the token tax on tea was
kept simply as an assertion of parliamentary authori-
ty. “A peppercorn in acknowledgment of the right
(to tax) is of more value than millions without it,”
was the commentary of Prime Minister George
Grenville.1 Ironically, despite the violence and
despite the residual tax, there was, at this point, a
general prosperity, and most people really did not
care to get actively involved. The average colonist
found it fine to be relieved of paying the governor
and judges.2 Then, in 1773, the East India
Company, which was in financial difficulty, found
itself with excess tea and was granted a monopoly to
export it to the colonies. The company planned on
selling it through its own agents, eliminating the
independent merchants of the colonies and disposing
of the tea at less-than-market price. The economic
threat, as much as the political implications of taxa-
tion without representation, led the radical Sam
Adams and the Sons of Liberty to dump a shipload of
that tea into the Boston Harbor in December.
George III wrote his prime minister, “The die is now
cast; the colonies must either submit or triumph.”1
In retaliation, parliament closed the port of Boston,
strangling Boston’s economic airway. However,
instead of isolating Massachusetts as intended, the
Coercive Acts rallied the other colonies to her sup-
port. The Virginia Assembly called on all colonies to
send delegates to a congress of all continental
American colonies, which met in September 1774 in
Philadelphia. The First Continental Congress was
indeed the first organization to act on behalf of all 13
colonies. It set up committees of inspection in every
town and county to supervise nonimportation, non-
exportation, and nonconsumption agreements. In
short, it began creating an extra legal organization to
govern, or at least impact on American daily life, in
all 13 colonies.
In the face of armed conflict at Lexington and
Concord, the Second Continental Congress took
over the militia besieging the British in Boston and
appointed Washington commander in chief.
Although the colonies were working together, inde-
pendence was not yet a unanimous goal. In the
autumn of 1775, the legislatures of North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Maryland
went on record against independence. In January
1776 in the camp of the Continental Militia besieg-
ing Boston, the king’s health was toasted nightly in
the officers’ mess, presided over by General
Washington.2
There was considerable support for the colonies
in Great Britain. Many in England saw the Coercive
Acts pushed through parliament by the king and his
ministers as threatening their own liberties as much
as those of the colonies. The king’s first choice for
American military commander, Lord Jeffrey
Amherst, who had won a major victory in New York
during the French and Indian War, refused to serve
against the Americans.5 William Pitt, the great for-
mer prime minister responsible for England’s victo-
ry in the Seven Years’ War, defended the American
colonies on the grounds that “No subject of
England should be taxed unless by his own con-
sent,” adding, “You cannot but respect their cause
and wish to make it your own.”1 Even the great con-
servative Edmond Burke not only argued in support
of the principles of representation for the colonies,
but also summarized the pragmatic difficulties, say-
ing, “But let us suppose all these moral difficulties
got over. The ocean remains. You cannot pump this
dry; and as long as it continues in its present bed, so
long all of the causes, which weaken authority by
distance, will continue.”1
Ultimately, there was sufficient unity in the
colonies to declare independence in July 1776 and
initiate a war of revolution. Whether there was suffi-
cient unity and organization to win that war was
another question, and in the event victory was a near
thing. The Articles of Confederation passed by the
Continental Congress in 1777 implemented the
organization of government as it then existed. There
were five executive departments, but no chief exec-
utive. There was no federal judiciary, no control over
trade, and, most important, no direct taxing ability.2
With no power to tax, the Continental Congress had
to requisition moneys from the states and had no
authority or power to enforce this requisition. States
recruited their own militias, often paying them more
than Congress would pay the Continental Army.
The state militias often fought only when and where
their state was locally threatened. Washington
recruited and trained the Continental Army of regu-
lars, but maintained it with great difficulty. The
Continental Congress found it almost impossible to
provide the army with sufficient men, horses, food,
clothing, and weapons, particularly in the crucial
early years of the war. States continued to print their
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own currency, adding to the inflation of all paper
currency. The pay of soldiers and officers alike was
often months in the arrears and paid in depreciated
paper money. But it was this national army of regu-
lars, held together by Washington, whose endurance
was symbolized in the harsh winter camp at Valley
Forge, that was responsible for victory.4
It turned out to be a war of attrition, not so
much of men, but of will. The American victory at
Saratoga not only prompted the entrance of France
and ultimately Spain into the war against England,
but strengthened the political opposition in Britain.
When Cornwallis surrendered his army at Yorktown
to the combined force of Washington’s Continental
Army and the French Army under Rochambeau,
political support in Britain for the war fell dramati-
cally.4,5 Two armies had surrendered at Saratoga and
Yorktown. These troops were difficult to replace,
given that the cost and the requirements of war now
extended against France and Spain. Military activi-
ties on the North American continent ground to a
virtual halt. Moreover, the corruption and incompe-
tence of the British ministry were becoming increas-
ingly evident. King George at one point even con-
sidered abdicating,5 but remained, allowing the
opponents of war to take over the government and
eventually make peace. Thus, despite all the
parochialism and inefficiencies of the new American
government, the fact that it and its army under
Washington survived intact and were able to reach
military stalemate was sufficient to win victory and
independence.
It is interesting to reread this history after our
own struggle in Vietnam. Both struggles were
viewed by one side as wars of revolution and inde-
pendence. For Britain in the late 18th century and
for the United States in the mid-20th century, the
wars were fought far from home with considerable
opposition on the home front. In both cases, the war
became too costly in dollars, lives, and political sup-
port to continue.
When the Revolutionary War ended, the com-
pelling need for unity had passed. The organization
provided by the Articles of Confederation proved
unable to solve the problems of the day: inflation,
trade, and colonization of the western lands. George
Washington in 1785 addressed the root cause of this
weak government: “We are either a united people
under one head and for federal purposes, or we are
13 independent sovereignties eternally counteract-
ing each other.”6 Recognition of the failure of the
weak national government led to the calling of a
convention to amend the Articles of Confederation.
From a long effort of statesmanship and political
horse-trading, a new Constitution emerged, provid-
ing a stronger union with the power to tax, to treaty,
to wage war, and to sanction.2,6 It had a federal judi-
ciary and an executive branch that was not strong
initially, but was able to develop strength in the next
200 years.
However, when speaking of the nation, the syntax
continued to be plural: “The United States are . . .”7
Despite the greater unity of the Constitution, many
people still felt that states could pick up their marbles
and go home if the game did not go their way. The
threat of secession first appeared in New England.
During Jefferson’s first term after the Louisiana
Purchase, unhappy Federalists from Massachusetts
and Connecticut proposed a Northern Confederacy.2
This effort died with Jefferson’s overwhelming re-
election, but the economic frustration in New
England, caused by the loss of trade during the War
of 1812, again led to talk of secession. A convention
of New England states met at Hartford to consider
New England’s leaving the union and negotiating a
separate peace with Great Britain. Fortunately, these
resolutions were turned down.2
The issue of slavery had been avoided by our
founding fathers, because there was no hope of an
agreement to limit it. For unity to be achieved, slav-
ery was deliberately ignored, and the dreadful insti-
tution continued. Increasingly, it divided the coun-
try. During the Civil War that ensued, the United
States Army grew from a force of 16,000 to nearly
one million.7 The development of the army medical
service is one example of the increase in size and
integration of organization required to manage this
enormous increase in manpower.7,8 Three hundred
thousand Union soldiers died, 100,000 from
wounds and twice that number from disease. (Not
until World War I would disease kill fewer than com-
bat.) At the onset of the war, the largest army hos-
pital contained 40 beds. Field care was based on reg-
imental hospitals. Regiments at full strength gener-
ally had 1000 to 1300 men. The regimental hospital
organization was originally taken from the British
Army. The British argued that the patient does best
with the doctor he knows. There was no articulated
organization of these hospitals and no chain of evac-
uation. At the first Battle of Bull Run, that notori-
ous, improvised Union disaster just south of
Washington, DC, each regimental surgeon took care
of his own unit, and soldiers wounded at a distance
from the regimental surgeon were often left untend-
ed. The few ambulances available had civilian drivers
who ran off at the firing of the first guns of the bat-
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tle. Subsequent investigations were unable to learn
of the single wounded man from the battle reaching
the capital in an ambulance.8 A year later at the sec-
ond battle on that site (Second Bull Run or Second
Manassas as its known to our Southern colleagues),
Pope’s improvised Union Army of Virginia not only
lost the battle, but left 3000 Union wounded on the
battlefield for 3 days, most of them untended. Six
hundred wounded still lay on the battlefield 5 days
after the battle.8
Gradually, organization was improved in the
Union Army. Regimental hospitals were replaced by
larger brigade hospitals, which were, in turn,
replaced by still larger hospitals attached to the divi-
sion. By 1863, division hospitals were often clus-
tered together as a single hospital in support of a
corps. These larger units allowed for supervision and
specialization of medical care. Only the most quali-
fied surgeons were made primary operators. The
combination of specialization and better supervision
allowed by this concentration of medical care sub-
stantially improved the quality of care delivered to
the sick and wounded.8
In addition, a better ambulance corps was orga-
nized. The civilian drivers were replaced with disci-
plined soldiers. At Gettysburg in July 1863,
Letterman, the medical director of the Army of the
Potomac, commanded an organization of 650 medical
officers, 1000 ambulances, and 3000 drivers and
stretcher-bearers. Fourteen thousand Union wounded
were removed from that field in the 3 days of combat,
almost all on the day they were wounded. A chain of
evacuation was established, with policies for early
movement of patients to rear hospitals to keep the
beds open for new casualties. By the end of the war,
general hospitals averaged 600 beds, with the larger
ones having nearly 4000 beds. The army, the largest
hospital of which had been 40 beds before the war,
now had a total of 136,000 hospital beds in an orga-
nized system of evacuation, the principles of which
continue to this day.8 There were, however, amusing
anecdotes. According to Army policy, the surgeon in
charge was also the military commander of the hospi-
tal. One of these commanding surgeons was so
impressed by this position that he made daily rounds
at the head of his entourage, which marched in full
dress uniform through the corridors of the hospital to
the accompaniment of marching fife and drum.8
Through the horrible internecine carnage of the
Civil War, Lincoln, like Washington before him,
emerged as both the leader and symbol of the Union
resolve to maintain the unity of the United States.7
In the face of political opposition, painfully long
casualty lists, at times military incompetence, draft
riots, and Democratic party copperheads calling for
ending the war by letting the South go loose,
Lincoln persisted. Lincoln’s struggle for leadership
of the Union was as difficult as the struggle with the
Confederacy. Even in August 1864, with Grant pin-
ning Lee to the trenches before Petersburg and
Richmond and with Sherman marching on Atlanta,
Lincoln’s popularity was so low that his own
Republican party made tentative efforts to dump
him as their presidential candidate in the forthcom-
ing November election.7 However, in a way his
counterpart Jefferson Davis could never achieve,
Lincoln held together opposing interests by using
that strength to defeat both internal foes and, ulti-
mately, to achieve a national victory. In contrast, the
southern states remained just as jealous of their
unique states’ rights in the Confederacy as they were
of the Union. Difficulties in uniting the states’
efforts continually hampered the effective execution
of the Confederate war effort.7
The Union victory in the Civil War ridded the
continent of slavery and the nation of secession. The
federal government was immeasurably strengthened,
and another milestone on the long path to a
strengthened executive branch had been passed. The
war had shown the value and necessity of large-scale
organization in the nation that now spanned the
entire continent. Moreover, it gave the experience of
working in large scale organizations to a whole gen-
eration of people. Symbolic of these achievements of
unity and organization, the syntax became singular:
“The United States is . . . ”7
History must be interpreted with caution.
George Santanya’s well-known quote, “Those who
do not study history are condemned to repeat it,”
can be answered by the lesser-known quote of
Henry Ford, “History is bunk.” My point in relating
this history is not to advocate for any particular form
of organization, but rather to argue that unity and
organization are necessary to achieve great things. I
would argue further that, in this history of stress and
conflict, not just better organization, but increased
central authority contributed to success. The two
greatest icons in our national pantheon, Washington
and Lincoln, achieved their hallowed fame through
advocacy and implementation of unity and stronger
central authority. I must add parenthetically, howev-
er, that the centralizing of authority can be pushed
too far. The political and economic failure of the
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc are examples of
the failure of overly centralized, overly rigid, overly
controlling authority. Local initiative and individual
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incentives are still useful strands in the fabric of
human endeavor.
If we were to list the dominant themes in health
care today and for the near future, we would proba-
bly all agree on at least three: continued scientific
advancement at the molecular level; increasingly
complex, valuable and expensive technology; and
substantial limitation on the money available for
health care delivery. I would argue, however, that
increasing organization is the fourth dominant
theme of health care delivery today and will be even
more evident in the future.
Organization has certainly hit the business of
health care delivery. Hospital mergers, health main-
tenance organizations, and integrated delivery sys-
tems are all part of this change. What I would really
like to address, however, is not organization for the
business of health care. Instead, I would argue that
a strong impetus for improved organization in the
delivery of health care arises in the front-line trench-
es of patient care. Our patients are more complex,
older, and have more comorbid diseases. For exam-
ple, a number of years ago, we presented to this soci-
ety comparative data on the surgical management of
renal artery disease during two successive intervals.9
Looking just at the patients with atherosclerosis
(Table), we see in the more recent interval that the
patients are more than a decade older and the over-
whelming majority have substantial comorbidities of
atherosclerosis, with the need for revascularization
not simply to control hypertension, but also to pre-
vent end-stage renal failure. Our treatment is more
complex, with multiple modalities and intervention-
al therapies available, either singularly or combined.
Moreover, the velocity of our delivery of health
care has increased. It is as if we are flying a more
complex airplane at a much higher speed in a much
more crowded air space. We are managing older and
sicker patients with shorter lengths of hospital stay,
including “just-in-time” delivery to the operating
room, and we are doing this with ever-shrinking
budgets. Accomplishing this with the requisite time-
liness, precision, and quality requires improved artic-
ulation and integration of the sequential steps of
diagnosis, evaluation, treatment, and follow-up. The
Issues Committee, under Dr Patterson’s leadership,
has given us examples of how some groups have
reorganized to better address these patient care
issues.
Moreover, there is clear evidence that we need to
redesign our systems of health care delivery to
reduce error and improve quality.10,11 To maintain
and improve quality, we as physicians have tradition-
ally depended on our individual commitment to
“doing it right.” This is backed by a tradition of hard
work, continuing education, and critical review of
error. There is increasing evidence from other indus-
tries that we can do more.10 We need to redesign
our systems to keep them simple and more stan-
dardized to help avoid error, to provide redundancy
and guidance to reduce error, and to identify error
before it is implemented.10 To accomplish this
redesign, we need data collection and analysis and
system redesign that extends far beyond our individ-
ual practice and beyond hospital walls. Properly
designed and operated, integrated delivery systems
can improve the access and quality of regional health
care. I believe we need to consider, as did the Army
Medical Corps in the Civil War, a more organized
approach to establishing echelons of patient care.
Current statewide trauma systems provide a useful
example of such attempts at organization12 and also
the political difficulties associated with those
attempts.
This talk opened with the paradox of syntax in
our Declaration of Independence, “These United
Colonies are . . .” and the tension symbolized in that
syntax between central authority and peripheral
autonomy. There is in American medical practice a
long and hallowed tradition of individual physician
autonomy. We, as surgeons, clearly have espoused
autonomy as one of our most heartfelt values. It is
part of why we entered surgery. We value the
responsibility of decision, the sense of control and
our own independence. We applaud the image of the
captain alone on the bridge in isolated and absolute
decision. Our practice is a craft; we are artisans. Even
our traditional method of reimbursement is for
piecework. We resemble, to a remarkable extent in
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Data on patients undergoing renal artery recon-
struction for atherosclerotic occlusive disease of the
renal artery during two intervals*
1968 to 1980 1985 to 1990
Average age 50 y 63 y




*Generalized atherosclerosis refers to patients with clinical mani-
festations of atherosclerosis in at least one other organ than the
kidney. (Courtesy of Bredenberg CE, Sampson LN, Ray FS,
Cormier RA, Heintz S, Eldrup-Jorgensen J: Changing patterns in
surgery for chronic renal artery occlusive diseases. J Vasc Surg
15:1018-24, 1992.)
AS, Atherosclerosis.
practice and culture, a cottage industry at the dawn
of the 19th century before the industrial revolution,
the very antithesis of organization.
Yet, we, as surgeons, are no strangers to organi-
zation. We studied thermodynamics in physical
chemistry. We are probing the organization of the
cell. We have as an example of integration our daily
experience with the human physiology of our
patients. We have worked in the tight discipline of
the resident team during our training, and we daily
exercise the discipline and organization of surgery.
But we are not naturally organizational people. To
be effective in an organization requires us to give up
some of the autonomy we love so well. It means hav-
ing loyalty and allegiance to institutional goals or the
goals of a group. It requires us to learn how to com-
promise in a process without compromising essential
values or goals. It means that, unlike Frank Sinatra,
we cannot always “do it my way.” For surgeons, this
is a tough pill to swallow.
The leadership of Washington and of Lincoln
was critical to our nation’s success. In contrast, fail-
ures of leadership were important contributions to
the defeat of England and the Confederacy. Health
care organizations need our leadership. Effective
leadership, however, is no longer the strict hierarchal
control relationship we grew up with in surgical res-
idency. Absolute hierarchal command and control
works only if one is endowed with absolute and lim-
itless power. In reality, few are so endowed. If the
lessons of Washington and Lincoln are credible,
leadership requires the ability to compose the differ-
ences among a group. At the bedside, we need to
understand that our success and that of our patient
depend on more than just our individual efforts. The
ability to unite, motivate, organize, and lead the
patient-care team defines our success more fully than
our own individual virtuosity. We need to learn col-
laboration, cooperation, and the ability and willing-
ness to learn from colleagues of all levels (including
sometimes even hospital administrators).13
I am not suggesting that leadership is all warm
and fuzzy. We remain accountable for our actions,
and there is an inevitable hierarchy to that account-
ability. As President of the United States, Harry
Truman said, “The buck stops here.” So it must
with us. That essential surgical ethic must and shall
remain.
Before closing, let me add my personal com-
ments on two issues of organization and unity par-
ticularly relevant to this organization. First, the place
of vascular surgery within the American Board of
Surgery. Currently, the leaders in vascular surgery
are working with the American Board of Surgery to
achieve what might be called a “dominion status”
within a “commonwealth” of surgical specialties.
Like the colonies along the North Atlantic Seaboard
in the late 18th century, there is an inevitability to
vascular surgery having more control over its des-
tiny. Yet, I fear that, both in the larger intellectual
world and the pragmatic political world, vascular
surgery’s declaring complete independence from the
American Board of Surgery would not be in the best
interests of our profession. I hope that dominion
status will continue to give vascular surgery impor-
tant control over its education and development and
still maintain the value of union with a broader
world of surgery.
Similarly, although this is the New England
Society for Vascular Surgery’s first meeting indepen-
dent from the New England Surgical Society, I hope
that, both as individual surgeons and as an organiza-
tion, we do not completely divorce ourselves from
our sister organization. We share common values,
common goals, and many common members. I
encourage participation of vascular surgeons in both
societies.
Finally, one last anecdote about change. I recent-
ly admitted an elderly patient with complex prob-
lems. Initially unable to establish contact with the
patient’s elderly wife, who lived some distance away
and was housebound, I asked that my home phone
number be given to her when she called. The patient
later commented that when he related this event to a
friend, he was told, “Well, that doctor must be over
50 to have given out his home phone number.”
Indeed, I am over 50, but I hope that the comment
is otherwise in error. If it is not, then I and the oth-
ers here responsible for the education of medical stu-
dents and residents have failed. For all our immersion
in the last 3 days and in our daily work in the ques-
tions of molecular biology, complex technology, sta-
tistical analysis, and organizational effort, we must
never lose the fundamental value of our profession:
We care for people. I hope that we all will continue
this caring as our paramount value and, most impor-
tant, pass it on intact and vibrant to our successors.
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